RelProMax Antitrust, Inc.

About the Inventor

• "Method and Apparatus for Preventing Oligopoly Collusion," Patent application originally filed on November 29, 1988. U.S. Patent 5,608,620 issued March 4, 1997.
  
• "Using Relative Profit Incentives to Prevent Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 11, Number 4, August 1996, pp. 533-550.
  
• Contest Report, Contest to Investigate an Economic Invention, 1993.
• For copies of patents and papers for invention 1, see Technical Papers

• "Method of Eliciting Unbiased Forecasts by Relating a Forecaster's Pay to the Forecaster's Contribution to a Collective Forecast," Patent application originally filed on March 19, 1990. U.S. Patent 5,608,620 issued March 4, 1997.
  
• "Forecasting Incentives Based on Value Marginal Product"
  
• "Peer-Group Forecasting Incentives for Unobserved Variables"
  
• "Forecasting Incentives for an Aggregated Mutual Fund"
• For copies of patents and papers for invention 2, see Valmarpro Forecasting, Technical Papers

• "A Combined Test For Equity and Efficiency in DSM Funding," Proceedings of the Eighth NARUC Biennial Regulatory Information Conference, Volume I: Electric & Gas, The National Regulatory Research Institute, NRRI 92-20, September 1992, pp. 225-244.
  
• Conservation and Demand-Side Management Activities of Illinois Utilities, 1988-1990, Illinois Commerce Commission Staff Report, January 1992.
  
• Ph.D. Thesis: "Prospect Theory and Imperfect Reputation as Microeconomic Causes of Downward Wage Rigidity and Involuntary Unemployment."
  
• "Efficiency of the Information Incentives of a Financial Market"
  
• "Distributional Implications of Marginal-Productivity Natural Property Rights"
  
• "Conflict Resolution in a Federation of Unequal States"
  
• "Military Defense in a Federation of Unequal States"
  
• "Can Economics Predict the Next Global War?" with James Lynch
  
• "Alternative Approaches to Solving Keynesian Unemployment Within a General Equilibrium Macroeconomic Model"
  
• "A Prospective Cause of Downward Wage Rigidity."

EDUCATION:

Princeton University, Ph.D. economics, January 1988.

University of California - Davis, A.B. economics, June 1982.

College of San Mateo, A.A. data processing, January 1981.

• Mine Safety and Health Administration, Arlington, Virginia, Economist, August 2000 to present.
  
• United States Census Bureau, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, Survey Statistician, November 1997 to August 2000.
  
• Illinois Commerce Commission, Springfield, Illinois, Energy Programs Division: Integrated Resource Planning (10/92 to 5/95) & Energy Conservation (7/91 to 9/92), Economic Analyst, July 1991 to May 1995, Promoted to Senior Economic Analyst, March 1992.
  
• Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, Visiting Assistant Professor, August 1990 to May 1991.
  
• Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, Research Fellow, College of Urban, Labor, and Metropolitan Affairs, November 1988 to July 1989.
  
• Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan, Temporary Assistant Professor, January 1988 to May 1988; Temporary Instructor, August 1987 to December 1987.
  
• Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, Visiting Instructor, September 1986 to June 1987.

RESEARCH FIELDS:

Industrial Organization

Labor Economics

Microeconomic Theory

• Filed an amicus brief before the Appeals Court in the Microsoft antitrust case, Consolidated Docket Nos. 00-5212 & 00-5213, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit. Brief advocated that the District Court should have held remedy hearings before deciding on remedy. Also filed an amicus brief during second appeal, Docket 03-5030, after Tunney Act hearings.
  
• Filed amicus briefs and Tunney Act comments before the District Court in the Microsoft antitrust case, Consolidated Civil Action Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233 (TPJ & CKK), U.S. District Court for D.C. Briefs advocated use of relative profit maximizing incentives to assure no collusion and no predatory behavior by successor Microsoft firms. Tunney Act comments also provided a computer model showing that breaking Microsoft into two or more companies is best for consumers.
  
• Filed four public comments in Federal Communications Commission Docket 99-333, Proposed Merger of MCI WorldCom, Inc. and Sprint Corporation. Advocated the use of relative profit maximizing incentives as a way for the merger to pass antitrust hurdles.
  
• Performed regulatory economic analysis for the proposed rule and the final rule for the use of belt air in underground coal mines.
  
• Performed regulatory economic analysis for the final rule for emergency evacuations in underground coal mines.
  
• Performed regulatory economic analysis for unpublished mining industry rules.
  
• Case manager and witness in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket 94-0066, the third comprehensive electric energy least-cost plan for the State of Illinois.
  
• Case manager and witness in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket 92-0270, the least-cost plan for one Illinois electric utility.
  
• Witness in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket 92-0268, the least-cost plan for a large Illinois electric utility; used SAS statistical software to investigate the econometric forecasting models of this Illinois utility.
  
• Witness in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket 92-0271, the least-cost plan for a large Illinois electric utility; used EGEAS planning software to implement an integrated planning model for this Illinois utility.

PERSONAL:

Born, San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Separated, 2005

Three Children, born 1991, 1996, 1998

For additional information, please contact RelProMax Antitrust, Inc.